William & Mary Law Review
Volume 10 (1968-1969)
Issue 4

Article 16

May 1969

Criminal Law - Search and Seizure - Probable Cause Standard and
the Informant - Spinelli v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969).
Ray C. Stoner

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons

Repository Citation
Ray C. Stoner, Criminal Law - Search and Seizure - Probable Cause Standard and the Informant Spinelli v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969)., 10 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1004 (1969),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss4/16
Copyright c 1969 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

1004

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:988

Criminal Law-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD
INFORMANT. Spinelli v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969).

AND THE

An agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in support of an
application for a search warrant, submitted an affidavit reciting that:

(1) the FBI had been "informed by a confidential reliable informant"
that Spinelli was conducting gambling operations by the means of two
specified telephones; (2) an FBI investigation had shown the suspect
to be a "known" bookmaker; and, (3) Spinelli had been seen by the
agent on numerous occasions entering and leaving the apartment in
which the specified phones were located.' The warrant was issued upon
these.grounds, and Spinelli was subsequently convicted of interstate
2
travel in aid of racketeering.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction; 3 the Supreme Court, after granting certiorari, 4 limited their review
to the question of the constitutional validity of the warrant., The Court
reversed, holding that the affidavit did not furnish probable cause.
Under the provision of the fourth amendment that no warrant shall
be issued without probable cause," it has been held that it is the magistrate's role to survey the facts presented to him and determine if the
requirements of the amendment are met.7 To do this a standard must
be established from which he can gauge certain factors and render his
decision accordingly.8 The magistrate has become interposed between
the police and the citizenry in the determination of probable cause.'
1. Spinelli v. United States, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969).

2. Spinelli was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1964).
3. 382 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1967).
4. 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
5. 391 U.S. 933 (1968).

6. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
7. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); see, e.g., United States ex rel. DeNegris v.
Mengor, 360 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712 (2d Cir.
-1959).

8. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); see Commonwealth v. Penta,
1225 N.E.2d 58 (Mass. 1967); LaFave and Remington, Controlling the Police: The
Judge's Role in Making & Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MicH. L. Rzv.
987 (1965). LaFave and Remington conclude:
Judicial participation in law enforcement decisions is not very meaningful in practice. The judicial officer is usually not consulted in advance,
and, when he is, his participation is largely perfunctory. , . . Even when
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Hearsay information has been deemed sufficient as a source for probable cause where a "substantial basis" for crediting its validity is -presented. 10 This has been true in warrant and non-warrant cases.11 In
the normal case, law enforcement officials have attempted to predicate
probable cause on an informant's tip.'2 The courts then have been presented with a conflict between the protection of the "informer's privilege" 13 and the accused's fourth amendment rights.'- From this context, two lines of cases have developed concerning the informant and
probable cause.
In Aguilar v. Texas,15 the Supreme Court established a two-point
probable cause standard in dealing with an affidavit resting upon "reliable information from a credible person." 6 The Court held that an
a warrant is obtained, the objective of the police usually is not to acquire
a judicial evaluation of the grounds for arrest; rather, the warrant is
sought as a booking device or to serve some other administrative function. Id. at 992.
9. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
See generally, Miller and Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decisioi;
A Study of Current Practices, 1964 WAsu. UJ,.Q. 1. The study suggested that often
the documents were signed without a detailed reading of the contents, but th-ri
the decisions were not ones of a "detached" magistrate.
10. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). See, e.g., United States v. Freeman,
358 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1966).
11. Compare Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Rudendorf v. United States,
376 U.S. 528 (1964), 'with McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) and Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
12. One of the first definitions was set down in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, at 175-76 (1949)
Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within .
[the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed.
13. The informer's privilege is the prosecution's evidentiary privilege of withholdii4
the informer's identity, but its effect is also to grant the informer the privilege of
having his anonymity preserved, and it is for this reason that the informer is williqig
to come forward to supply information. A more definitive statement concerning the
informer, as required by the Court in Aguilar, goes far to destroy the usefulness of
this privilege.
14. The "infoi-mer's privilege" was first protected in Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957). See generally, Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool
Pigeons and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE LJ. 1091 (1951); Comment, Warrantless
Arrest and Search on the Basis of Informer's Communication, 42 ST. Jom's L. REY.
270 (1967).
15. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
16. See generally, Nedrud, An Clutline "ofArrest, Search & Seizure, 5 TmsA L. Rzv.
154 (1968); Comment, Informer's Word as the Basis for Probable Cause in the Federi-l
Courts, 53 CAr'. L. REv. 840 (1965).
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affidavit might properly rely on hearsay information so long as the magistrate is informed of "some of the underlying circumstances" both (1)
from which the informant reached his conclusion, and (2) from which
the affiant concluded the informant was reliable or credible.
In subsequent cases, the lower courts failed to give emphasis to the
second point of this standard. Instead, conclusory recitals of reliability
were deemed sufficient in meeting this test.17 The Supreme Court reinforced that practice by warning against viewing warrant requirements
too "hypertechnically," and by stressing a "common sense" application
of Aguilar's standard.-"
Aguilar did not encompass the approach taken by the Court in
Draperv. United States,' which held that knowledge gained from an
informer and corroborated by innocent facts in themselves could support an arrest without a warrant. A greater emphasis was placed on
prior reliability as opposed to Aguilar's "substantial basis" of accreditation of the tip's validity and source.20 Draperemphasized as its standard,
the totality of circumstances, including personal observations, informant's tips, and other factors. 21 In contrast to Draper, Aguilar
focused on the probative value of the information given to the affiant as
the gauge by which the magistrate should draw his conclusion.
In Spinelli, the Supreme Court placed emphasis on a strict application
of Aguilar as the proper standard of probable cause, and in doing so,
the Court rejected Draper's "totality of circumstances" approach.2 By
Draper standards, the independent information may very well have
17. See, e.g., United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1967); Smith v. United
States, 358 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459 (2d
Cir. 1966).
18. United States v. Ventresca, 380 US. 102 (1965); see Comment, supra note 14.
19. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). The information given by the informant in Draper included
the accused's supposed sale of narcotics, his attire, his speed in walking, that he
carried a tan bag, and that he could be found at a designated time at a Denver railroad
station.
Given a reliable informer, as in Draper, verification of such innocent
details, although not directly suggestive of guilt, probably does perform
a legitimate function. It reduces the possibility that the reliable informer's
information in a particular instance, although given in good faith, is
inaccurate. Where there is no pre-established reputation for reliability, the
value of innocent corroboration, without more, is questionable. Comment,
supra note 16, at 843.
20. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States
v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1966).
21. See Comment, The Effect of the Fourth Amendment on Arrests Without a
Warrant,26 LA. L. Rnv. 789 (1966).
22. 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969).
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given the "suspicious" color needed to support the tip,2 but Spinelli
precludes the further application of Draper in cases inconsistent with
Aguilar. Although not expressly overruling Draper,24 the Court feels
it is the test of Aguilar which the magistrate should use in ruling on
questions of probable cause.
RAY C. STONER

23. id. at 592-95 (J. 'White concurring).
24. The Court in Spinelli concludes:
In holding as we have done, we do not retreat from the established
propositions that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of
criminal activity is the standard of probable cause, Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 228, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); that affidavits of
probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards than those
governing the admissibility of evidence at trial, McCray v. Illinois, 386
U.S. 300, 311, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 1062 (1967); that in judging probable cause
issuing magistrates are not to be confined by nigardly limitations or by
restrictions on the use of their common sense, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108, 85 S.Ct. 741, 745 (1964); and that their determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing
courts, Jones v. United States, 362 US. 257 270-71, 80 S.Ct. 725, 735-36
(1960). Id. at 590-91.

